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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
FULLAM, District Judge 
 
 
 The appellants, Willem Ridder, Lyndon C. Merkle, John 
T. Hurst and Gregory DeVany, were employed by City Collateral and 
Financial Services, Inc. a wholly owned subsidiary of City 
Federal Savings Bank, which in turn was the wholly owned 
subsidiary of appellee CityFed Financial Corporation ("CityFed"), 
a Delaware corporation now in receivership.   Resolution Trust 
Corporation ("RTC"), as receiver for CityFed, has sued the 
appellants in a companion case in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey, Resolution Trust Corp. v. 
Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, et al., case No. 92-
l003(D.N.J.), asserting that the appellants committed various 
frauds and breaches of their fiduciary duty to their employer.   
Specifically, the RTC asserts that appellants (l) exceeded their 
authority by approving loans to Northwest Mortgage Co., Inc., (2) 
concealed Northwest's default from CityFed's credit committee, 
(3) misrepresented to the credit committee the status of the 
Northwest line of credit, (4) misstated to the committee the 
risks associated with the Northwest loan, (5) concealed 
Northwest's criminal activity from CityFed, (6) falsified City 
Collateral records, and (7) improperly divulged confidential 
information for personal gain. 
  
 Upon being served with the complaint in the RTC action, 
appellants made demand upon CityFed to advance funds for 
attorneys fees they would incur in defending the RTC litigation.  
CityFed refused, whereupon appellants brought this action to 
compel CityFed to advance attorneys fees to them.  Plaintiff 
sought a preliminary injunction to obtain immediate payment, and 
also filed a motion for summary judgment.  After a hearing, the 
district court denied both motions, and appellants timely filed 
this appeal. 
 Article XI of CityFed's by-laws requires CityFed to 
indemnify and hold harmless all employees sued or threatened to 
be sued by reason of such employment by CityFed or any of its 
subsidiaries, "to the fullest extent authorized by the Delaware 
corporation law", and specifically provides that the right to 
indemnity "shall include the right to be paid the expenses 
incurred in defending any such proceeding in advance of its final 
disposition; provided, however that, if the Delaware Corporation 
Law so requires [it does] the payment of such expenses ... shall 
be made only upon delivery to the corporation of an undertaking 
... to repay all amounts so advanced if it shall ultimately be 
determined that such employee is not entitled to be indemnified."  
[Emphasis added.]   These by-law provisions are substantially 
identical to the provisions of the Delaware Corporation Law on 
the subject.    
  
 The district court denied the injunction sought by 
appellants for two reasons.  Because of the perceived strength of 
the RTC's case against the appellants in the related litigation, 
the court concluded that appellants had failed to demonstrate a 
likelihood of success on the merits.   And, in view of the fact 
that CityFed is in receivership and the rights of other creditors 
are implicated, the court felt that the harm to appellants from 
denial of the injunction was outweighed by the public interest in 
assuring equal treatment to all of CityFed's creditors, and that 
appellants' claim should not be accorded priority by the issuance 
of a preliminary injunction.   We conclude that neither reason 
suffices to justify denial of the relief plainly mandated by the 
by-laws and the Delaware statute. 
 The issue before the district court was not whether 
appellants were likely to prevail in the RTC litigation, but 
whether they were likely to prevail in their assertion that 
CityFed should advance the costs of defense.  Under Delaware law, 
appellants' right to receive the costs of defense in advance does 
not depend upon the merits of the claims asserted against them, 
and is separate and distinct from any right of indemnification 
they may later be able to establish.   Citadel Holding Corp. v. 
Roven, 603 A.2d 8l8 (Del. l992); Salaman v. National Media Corp., 
No. C.A. 92C-0l-l6l, l994 WL465534 (Del. Super. July 22, l994).  
See Joseph Warren Bishop, Jr.,  Law of Corporate Officers and 
Directors Indemnification and Insurance, ¶6.27 (l98l & Supp. 
  
l993).  Indeed, the provisions in both Article XI of CityFed's 
by-laws and §l45(e) of the Delaware corporation law, conditioning 
the obligation to advance defense costs upon an undertaking "to 
repay such amount if it shall ultimately be determined that [the 
officer] is not entitled to be indemnified by the corporation" 
leaves no room for argument on that score.  
 CityFed urges us to adopt the approach taken by the 
district court in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn v. 
Felicetti, 830 F.Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa. l993), and rule that, 
notwithstanding the by-law provision, CityFed was justified in 
refusing to advance defense costs because of "the overriding duty 
of the directors to act in the best interests of the 
corporation".  Id., at 269.  We respectfully disagree.  Given a 
choice between decisions of the appellate courts of Delaware and 
courts of other jurisdictions, on issues of Delaware law, this 
court is plainly required to follow the decisions of the Delaware 
courts.  Moreover, we find the reasoning in Felicetti 
unpersuasive.  Rarely, if ever, could it be a breach of fiduciary 
duty on the part of corporate directors to comply with the 
requirements of the corporation's by-laws, as expressly 
authorized by statute.   
 The statutory provisions authorizing the advancement of 
defense costs, conditioned upon an agreement to repay if a right 
of indemnification is not later established, plainly reflect a 
legislative determination to avoid deterring qualified persons 
  
from accepting responsible positions with financial institutions 
for fear of incurring liabilities greatly in excess of their 
means, and to enhance the reliability of litigation-outcomes 
involving directors and officers of corporations by assuring a 
level playing field.  It is not the province of judges to second-
guess these policy determinations. 
 Appellants made a strong showing that, unless defense 
costs were advanced to them, their ability to defend the RTC 
action would be irreparably harmed.  Appellee made no contrary 
showing, and the district court did not base its holding upon the 
absence of irreparable harm, but rather upon a comparison between 
the harm to appellants and the perceived harm to other creditors 
of CityFed.   Here again, however, we conclude that the district 
court addressed the wrong issue.  The only issue before the 
district court was whether appellants were entitled to advance 
payment of the cost of defense of the RTC action.   The 
insolvency proceeding itself was not before the district court, 
and the impact, if any, of a grant of injunctive relief was not 
only a matter for other tribunals to decide, but, on this record, 
purely speculative. 
 We conclude that the appellants are entitled to have 
their costs of defense advanced to them, as a matter of law.  The 
order appealed from will therefore be reversed, with instructions 
to issue an injunction requiring appellee to advance such defense 
  
costs as the parties by agreement, or the district court upon 
further proceedings, determines to be reasonable.   
      
